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RESTORING JUSTICE: LESSONS FROM TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND RWANDA 
 
EMILY B. MAWHINNEY1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The nature of conflict has undergone a transformation in the 
21st century.  As a result, the methods and strategies of conflict 
resolution have also been challenged to transform to meet the needs 
of those affected by conflict.  Interstate conflict, in which two 
countries go to war with each other using conventional military force, 
is no longer common because of the oversight and intervention of 
international and regional organizations, and third party states.2  A 
new type of conflict has emerged in the vacuum of interstate conflict 
that poses a serious challenge to traditional approaches to conflict 
resolution based on third-party intervention.3 Intrastate conflict, or 
civil conflict, is distinct from interstate conflict in several ways that 
have significant implications for the management and resolution of 
such conflict.4 Intrastate conflict often involves non-state actors 
armed with unconventional weapons and amorphous ideological or 
ethno-political motives.5  Because intrastate conflict is so complex, 
it is ill suited for effective management by traditional third-party 
intervention in the form of state-to-state diplomacy or humanitarian 
                                                 
1 Juris Doctor Expected May 2015, Hamline University School of Law.  Special 
thanks to Craig Swanson, Jack Mawhinney, and Sharon Press for their unwavering 
support.  This article is dedicated to Hanne B. Mawhinney, an inspiring scholar, 
dedicated mentor, and eternal optimist who always believed in the power of 
forgiveness. 
2 History of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/ (last visited May 2, 2014). 
3 David Carment & Dane Rowlands, Three’s Company: Evaluating Third Party 
Intervention in Intrastate Conflict. 42 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL  572, 574 (1998). 
4 Intrastate conflict is broadly classified as sustained, armed conflict occurring 
within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities; it has a lower 
fatality threshold than war.   Intrastate conflict typically arises between one or more 
contenders who define themselves using communal criteria, and make claims on 
behalf of the group’s collective ethnic, religious, ideological, or political interests 
against the state. See Patrick M. Regan, Conditions of Successful Third-Party 
Intervention in Intrastate Conflict. 40 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL 337, 338 (1996). 
5 Sexual violence is one example of unconventional weapons used in intrastate 
conflict. See Jennifer Park, Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War in International 
Humanitarian Law, 3 INT’L PUB POL’Y REV 13 (2007), available at 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr/journal/downloads/vol3-1/Park.pdf. 
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intervention,6 Instead, intrastate conflict requires a different 
approach to conflict resolution; it requires an approach that is rooted 
in restorative justice. 
What is it about civil conflict that makes it so difficult to 
resolve with conventional conflict resolution means?  At the heart of 
the ethnic, religious, ideological or political motives guiding 
intrastate conflict lays interpersonal conflict between neighbors.7 
Strategic NATO bombing or United Nations peacekeeping missions 
simply do not have the mandate to try to resolve conflict on that 
interpersonal level.8 Practices of restorative justice are better able to 
resolve the interpersonal conflicts that characterize intrastate conflict 
because they involve and empower the parties who are in conflict.  
For example, a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) can give 
victims, offenders, and the local community a greater sense of 
ownership over their own conflict resolution process by promoting 
forgiveness and creating a forum for truth telling.9 In ideal terms, 
TRC processes offer parties hope for the effective resolution of their 
conflict.  In practice, truth and reconciliation are not always effective 
or even possible, especially when the parties to the conflict are not 
yet ready to reconcile or when a cultural preference to forget impedes 
truth telling.10 
In order to analyze the use and effectiveness of TRCs, it is 
necessary to examine several key questions.  First, how does the 
philosophy of restorative justice shape the practice of truth and 
reconciliation? Second, what do TRCs do: what are their key 
features; when should they be implemented?  Third, what are the 
                                                 
6 Ronald Fisher, Methods of Third Party Intervention, BERGDORF HANDBK. FOR 
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 23 (2001), available at http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/fisher_hb.pd
f. 
7 Michael et al., Retributive and Restorative Justice, 32 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 
375, 384 (2008). 
8 Fisher, supra note 6, at 6. 
9 Rosalind Shaw, Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons 
from Sierra Leone, U. S. INST. OF PEACE 1, 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr130.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
10 Id. 
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most important lessons from past TRCs, such as those used in South 
Africa, and Rwanda?  Fourth, what recommended role should TRCs 
play in the resolution of future intrastate conflict?  While the theory 
of truth and reconciliation arises from the constructive idea of 
restoring justice, it is clear that the practice of reconciliation is 
complex, and it is very difficult to evaluate whether reconciliation 
has been achieved.11 Regardless of those challenges, truth telling and 
reconciliation are valuable practices that can help resolve some 
aspects of conflict by facilitating healing. 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
Restorative justice is an alternative to the retributive approach 
to justice through punishment.12 Restorative justice offers an 
alternative framework in which the owners of the conflict 
themselves, the offenders, victims, and communities are empowered 
to resolve their own conflict.13 In other words, restorative justice 
involves the direct participation of the affected parties in the process 
of resolving the conflict.14 Unlike retributive justice that emphasizes 
punishment as a means of righting wrongs, restorative justice 
empowers the parties themselves to restore justice by alternative 
means.15 At the core of restorative justice is a dialogical triad 
between victim, offender, and the community, all of whom ‘own’ the 
conflict.16 As part of a restorative process offenders are encouraged17 
to accept accountability for the harm they caused (as well as its 
                                                 
11 T. A. Borer, Reconciling South Africa or South Africans? Cautionary Notes 
from the TRC, 8 AFR STUD. Q. 19, 20 (2004). 
12 Wenzel, supra, note 7, at 375-76. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Paul McCold, Restorative Justice: The Role of Community, INT’L INST. FOR 
RESTORATIVE PRACS. (1995), available at 
http://www.irrp.edu/article.detail.php?article id=NTA1. 
16 Id. 
17 Wenzel’s use of the phrase ‘offenders are made to accept accountability’ is 
problematic because it contradicts the spirit of restorative justice. The offender 
should not be made to apologize, but rather, should be empowered to recognize his 
wrong, and should choose to apologize to the victim as an equal. 
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repair), show remorse, and offer an apology; victims are encouraged 
to overcome their resentment and offer forgiveness.18  The 
community may include the family members of the offender, and 
family members of the victim, both of whom play an important, 
though amorphous role in the restorative justice process.19 The 
precise role of the community will vary, but it is clear that 
communities need a mechanism to recover from the psychological 
injury caused by the conflict; “that mechanism involves rituals of 
forgiveness and release from anger.”20  Community involvement is a 
critical pillar of the restorative justice triad because empowering 
local communities to respond to their own conflicts meets the needs 
of the offender and victim to heal the psychological injury and anger 
created by the conflict, and helps to nurture responsible stewardship 
of conflict resolution processes.21 
Restorative justice can therefore be characterized as a process 
rooted in dialogue between the parties involved in a conflict, and 
their community.22 Through dialogue, both the victim and the 
offender are given a voice to express their views and emotions, and 
together with the community, establish a shared understanding of the 
harm the offense has done and the values it violated.23 Some scholars 
suggest that justice is restored when the offender takes responsibility 
for his actions by expressing a sincere apology to the victim and the 
community, and the victim offers forgiveness to the offender.24 More 
generally, justice may be restored when the social equilibrium that 
                                                 
18 Wenzel, supra note 7, at 377. 
19 In a statewide conflict such as Apartheid in South Africa, and the genocide in 
Rwanda, the community may also include the society as a whole.  The precise role 
of the society at large in a restorative justice process is too nuanced to address here.  
However, there will be a ‘trickle up’ effect in which smaller scale, community-
based restorative justice initiatives influence the restoration of justice in the society 
at-large. 
20 McCold, supra note 15,. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Wenzel, supra note 7, at 378. 
24 Id. 
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was damaged by the offense is restored through social action.25 The 
goal of restorative justice is thus to bring together the estranged 
victim, offender, and community and restore the original trust among 
those parties.26  Punishment, in the form of legal adjudication or 
informal revenge is noticeably absent from the restorative approach 
to justice.27 
The philosophy of restoring justice through dialogue is an 
integral component of any truth and reconciliation commission.  
Indeed, the idea of “dialogic morality” established by restorative 
justice is essential for truth and reconciliation.28  Arising out of the 
philosophy of Habermas’ discourse ethics, ‘dialogic morality’ 
suggests that morality is a social product, established through 
dialogue between members of an interdependent community.29 The 
practice of truth and reconciliation hinges on a social construction of 
morality, in which communities construct a shared understanding of 
right and wrong by engaging in dialogue.30  Unlike retributive 
practices in which the offender is punished for harming the victim, 
TRCs involve the victim, offender, and the local community in the 
process of restoring justice in the shared community.  TRCs embrace 
the restorative justice perspective that offenses are conflicts that 
rightfully belong to the victim and the offender.31  Because the victim 
and the offender are the ‘owners’ of the conflict, the involvement of 
criminal justice institutions and the imposition of legal remedies can 
“rob the parties of their opportunity, right, and duty to learn and grow 
through their conflicts.”32  To avoid this loss of opportunity, TRCs 
harness the restorative justice process “whereby all the parties with a 
stake in a particular offense come together to resolve collectively 
                                                 
25 Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Robert Howse, Institutions for Restorative Justice: The 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 355, 357 
(1999). 
26 McCold, supra note 15. 
27 Id. 
28 Wenzel, supra note 7, at 380. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 377. 
32 Id. 
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how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implications for 
the future.”33 
The guiding principles and practices of restorative justice 
provide a strong foundation for TRCs.  The philosophy of engaging 
the victim and offender in dialogue in order to construct a shared 
understanding of the conflict, and to resolve collectively how to deal 
with the aftermath of the offense is central to the work of TRCs.34 
Indeed, TRCs focus on the restorative principle of healing parties 
involved in a conflict, rather than punishing the offenders.  TRCs 
draw from restorative practices to promote more meaningful and 
constructive ‘punishments’35 that oblige the offender to do something 
for the victim, provide some service to the community, or take part 
in an education program.36  TRCs also draw from the philosophy of 
restorative justice to justify the use of amnesty as a way to encourage 
offenders to participate in the dialogical processes of restoring justice 
and reconciling parties in conflict.37 In principle, granting amnesty to 
offenders is compatible with the philosophy of healing rather than 
punishing.38 Amnesty can also be an essential tool in getting 
offenders, as well as victims to the table to begin a process of 
dialoguing. In reality, the idea of amnesty raises a serious question 
about the degree to which TRCs facilitate restoring justice through 
truth and reconciliation, or whether TRCs merely facilitate 
                                                 
33 Id. 
34 Wenzel, supra note 7, at 380. 
35 The term punishment, in reference to the consequence reached by the restorative 
process, is problematic.  It is only used here to juxtapose the idea of the outcome 
of retributive processes, which do produce punishments, and restorative processes, 
which do not emphasis punishment. 
36 Wenzel, supra note 7, at 377. 
37 TRCs may provide one of three types of amnesty: Blanket, limited or 
conditional amnesty. Blanket amnesty absolves perpetrators of liability for all 
crimes; limited amnesty may only apply to certain people, certain crimes, or certain 
time periods; conditional amnesty requires an application and testimony. See Truth 
and Reconciliation Commissions: Core Elements, THE PUB. INT’L LAW AND 
POLICY GRP.17 (May 2013), http://syriaaccountability.org/wp-
content/uploads/PILPG-Truth-and-Reconciliation-Memo-2012_EN.pdf. 
38 Id. 
36.2Restoring Justice: Reconcilliation In South Africa and 
Rwanda 27 
forgetting.39  In order to unpack the amnesty dilemma, as well as the 
other challenges of truth and reconciliation, it is useful to examine 
the features of TRCs more closely. 
 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS 
 
ORIGINS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
 
TRCs emerged in the late twentieth century in response to the 
growing influence of restorative justice, and the challenges of dealing 
with conflict in transitional societies.  While retributive justice called 
for criminal prosecution of offenses by war crimes tribunals, TRCs 
offered a restorative approach to justice.40 Through a restorative 
approach TRCs offered a way to address crimes and offenses in the 
country’s past through a process aimed at determining what 
happened, and why, in order to rebuild social bonds, rather than 
punishing guilty individuals.41 
Since 1973, more than 30 ‘commissions of inquiry’ and ‘truth 
and reconciliation commissions’ have been established in order to 
facilitate restorative justice in a variety of conflicts.42 Many of these 
                                                 
39 Sierra Leone illustrates the problems inherent in the contradictory practices of 
‘truth telling’ and ‘forgetting.’ Despite pressure from NGOs and human rights 
activists for a TRC in Sierra Leone, there was little popular support for such a 
commission because most ordinary people preferred a ‘forgive and forget’ 
approach, a particular kind of memory practice that was deeply ingrained in the 
culture of Sierra Leone. The TRC in Sierra Leone set itself in opposition to 
widespread local practices of social forgetting by validating verbally discursive 
remembering as the only road to reconciliation and peace. See Shaw, supra note 9. 
40 Id. 
41 Llewelyn, supra note 25, at 357. 
42 Uganda (1974, 1986-1995), Paraguay (1976), Bolivia (1982-1984), Argentina 
(1983-1984), Uruguay (1985), Zimbabwe (1985), Brazil (1986), Chile (1990-
1991), Chad (1991-1992), El Salvador (1992-1993), Rwanda (1999), Honduras 
(1993), Ethiopia (1993-2000), Germany (1992-1994), South Africa (1995), Haiti 
(1995-1996), Guatemala (1997-1999), Nigeria (1999), Sierra Leone (1999), East 
Timor (1999-2000).  Kevin Avruch & Beatriz Vejarano, Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions: A Review Essay and Annotated Bibliography, 2 SOCIAL JUSTICE: 
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commissions were created as transitional governments in newly 
emerging, fragile democracies struggled to account for the violence, 
crimes, and civil and human rights violations of previous regimes.43  
Those regimes faced strong pressure from within, and from the 
international community to follow the tradition of prosecuting war 
crimes established at Nuremburg.44 Indeed, criminal trials cater to a 
powerful “moral intuition, especially that of the outside spectators to 
the conflict, that the ‘monsters’ responsible for the acts in questions 
must be punished.”45  In response to that pressure, criminal tribunals 
were established to deal with many intrastate conflicts, most notably 
in Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia.46  However, the desire to 
prosecute is a retributive desire.  Critics of retributive justice such as 
Hannah Arendt argue that retributive prosecution does not foster 
social reconciliation or healing.47 TRCs offer an alternative way to 
deal with the past, and address the most difficult questions that arise 
as a result of conflict.48 Should human rights violators be punished 
or forgiven?  Is amnesty permissible and necessary in the interest of 
peace, reconciliation, and unity?  How can the victims of human 
rights violations be assisted to have their dignity restored?  Should 
history be ignored or acknowledged?  TRCs provide a way to address 
those complex questions. 
 
WHAT DO TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS DO? 
 
TRCs emerged in response to the limitations of war crimes 
tribunals to address the needs of the victims who were looking for 
                                                 
ANTHROPOLOGY, PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37 (2002), available at 
http://humiliationstudies.org/documents/AvruchTRC.pdf. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Llewelyn, supra note 25, at 358. 
46 See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.unictr.org/en/tribunal (last visited Apr. 3, 2015); see also International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
47 Llewelyn, supra note 25, at 358. 
48 Id. 
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healing, rather than punishment of perpetrators.49 In order to foster 
healing, TRCs reject the objectivity and neutrality favored by 
criminal tribunals, and created forums for truth telling that make 
space for the subjective and emotional dimension of being 
victimized.50 Truth plays a central role in the healing process, and in 
the restoration of justice for both victims and offenders.51 For 
victims, truth telling enables the victims to know the whole truth 
about the crimes they suffered, and the reasons behind those crimes, 
and to have their suffering publicly acknowledged.52  For the 
offenders, and the affected community, truth telling reveals the 
circumstances surrounding and reasons for the violations.53  Truth 
telling is therefore essential for effective healing, which is the central 
purpose of truth and reconciliation.  However, TRCs also serve a 
parallel purpose. 
In addition to, and in conjunction with, the creation of a 
forum for healing, TRCs also establish an independent, temporary 
commission of inquiry that investigates and reports on patterns of 
abuses of human rights or humanitarian law committed during 
determined periods of time.54 TRCs thus make recommendations for 
redressing human rights violations committed during periods of 
conflict, and preventing the repetition of human rights violations in 
the future.55 It is important that TRCs investigate abuses and make 
those recommendations from a restorative justice standpoint, rather 
than for the purpose of retributive prosecution. 
In order to maintain that distinction, and do restorative rather 
than retributive work, TRCs are usually constructed according to 
several common core elements: legitimacy drawn from consultation 
with the public, neutrality of personnel, a tailored mandate, adequate 
resources and funding, and the power to fulfill the objectives of the 
                                                 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Llewelyn, supra note 25, at 356. 
53 Id. 
54 MARK FREEMAN, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 11 (2006). 
55 Llewelyn, supra note 25, at 368. 
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commission through specific activities and recommendations.56  
Scholars have further specified that the legitimacy of a TRC’s policy 
has three conditions for efficacy; the truth must be known; the policy 
must represent the people’s will; and the policy must abide by 
international human rights norms.57  The first and third criteria are 
widely accepted, and often achieved by most TRCs, but the condition 
that the policy coincide with the will of the people is often more 
difficult to achieve.58  When these core elements and conditions are 
present, the practice of truth and reconciliation has the potential to 
facilitate an objective investigation of offenses, while helping 
victims and offenders share their subjective truths about their 
experiences in conflict. TRCs thus have the potential to transform 
conflict by providing a public platform for victims and offenders to 
share their personal stories, and can facilitate public debate about 
how to come to terms with the past.59  By engaging the nation in a 
discourse of truth telling, TRCs can help parties to intrastate conflict 
heal their wounds, and restore justice. 
 
WHEN SHOULD TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS BE 
IMPLEMENTED? 
 
In an ideal form, TRCs represent a powerful restorative tool; 
in reality TRCs are not immune to circumstances that limit their 
potential benefits.60 “Weak civil society, political instability, victim 
and witness fears about testifying, a weak or corrupt justice system, 
insufficient time to carry out investigations, lack of public support, 
and inadequate funding” all threaten to undermine the effectiveness 
of a TRC.61  Critics of TRCs also ask, “does anyone really know that 
                                                 
56 Id. 
57 Jeremy Sarkin, The Necessity and Challenges of Establishing a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda, 21 HUM. RIGHTS Q. 767, 804 (1999). 
58 Id. 
59 Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. U.N. SEC. COUNCIL 17 (2004), 
http://www.unrol.org/files/2004%20report.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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truth commissions secure the benefits of healing, catharsis, 
disclosure of truth, and national reconciliation?”62 These challenges 
raise several difficult questions: When should a TRC be formed in 
order to promote healing and restore justice to a society in conflict? 
How should the effectiveness or success of a TRC be measured?  Can 
a TRC be effective if it is implemented amidst significant political 
instability?  Can a TRC have the legitimacy, neutrality, authority, or 
resources to facilitate effective restorative dialogue, if the transitional 
government does not yet have authority or legitimacy?  Similarly, 
can dialogue be effective if the victims and offenders are afraid to 
testify because of ongoing conflict? 
It is unlikely that a TRC would be effective in such situations; 
therefore it would be best to implement a TRC after issues of political 
instability and fear have been resolved. But when precisely can a 
TRC be implemented effectively?  At what point during the process 
of resolving conflict is truth and reconciliation possible?  Despite the 
uncertainty of knowing when to implement a TRC, proponents of 
restorative justice argue that the practice of truth and reconciliation 
has tremendous potential to help parties to intrastate conflict 
transition toward peace.  Lessons from South Africa and Rwanda 
help illustrate the tremendous potential of TRCs as a restorative tool, 
as well as the challenges of truth telling, and balancing retributive 
and restorative justice initiatives. 
 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
ORIGINS 
 
The context out of which the South African Commission of 
Truth and Reconciliation (hereafter the ‘South African TRC’) 
emerged provides many useful lessons regarding reconciliation 
during a period of substantial political change.  The apartheid system 
of institutionalized racism fueled intrastate conflict between white 
                                                 
62 Borer, supra note 11, at 20. 
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Afrikaner settlers, and black South Africans from 1948 to 1990.63  
Following a period of international economic and diplomatic 
pressure, the government under F.W. De Klerk agreed to negotiate 
with the African National Congress party, led by Nelson Mandela in 
order to negotiate a transition away from the Apartheid system.64 In 
1994, following that period of negotiation, democratic elections were 
held, and an interim constitution was passed that legally ended the 
system of Apartheid.65  In 1995, the newly elected Government of 
National Unity, led by Nelson Mandela, set up the South African 
TRC with the mandate to “investigate gross human rights violations 
that were perpetrated by both state and liberation movements during 
the period of the Apartheid regime, including abductions, killings, 
and torture, to allow victims to tell their stories, to grant a historical 
record of the past, to grant amnesty where appropriate, and to draft a 
reparations policy.”66 
To accomplish that mandate, the South African TRC was 
divided into three committees; the Human Rights Violations 
Committee, the Amnesty Committee, and the Reparations and 
Rehabilitation Committee.67 The Amnesty Committee of the TRC 
was empowered to grant amnesty to perpetrators who confessed their 
crimes truthfully and completely to the commission, but the TRC 
also recommended that prosecution be considered in cases where 
amnesty was denied.68 The TRC heard testimony from 
approximately 22,000 victims, received approximately 7,000 
amnesty applications, and granted amnesty in approximately 1,000.69 
The final report of the TRC was fully endorsed by the government, 
                                                 
63 Truth Commission: South Africa, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, 
http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-south-africa (last visited Apr. 
6, 2015). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Truth Commission: South Africa, supra note 63. 
69 Id. 
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and President Nelson Mandela apologized to all victims on behalf of 
the state.70 
 
CORE ELEMENTS 
 
For many scholars, the South African TRC is considered 
effective because it met the core elements and conditions that 
facilitate truth and reconciliation.71 The South African TRC had 
legitimacy, or at least the illusion of legitimacy because it was 
established by a democratically elected government, and more 
importantly, because it drew legitimacy from an “exceptional degree 
of public participation.”72 Mandela made an effort to keep the 
commissioners neutral by appointing a committee to oversee a public 
nomination, selection, and interview process, and encouraged civil 
society groups to make nominations.73  The commissioners selected 
for the TRC included both men and women, and came from a range 
of backgrounds, and different parts of South Africa, although whites 
were over-represented.74  The mandate was clear, and was based on 
the normative idea that “a complete and truthful disclosure of past 
human rights abuses can guarantee lasting reconciliation.”75  The 
TRC commissioners were given considerable power, discretion, and 
resources to do their work, and did ultimately produce a substantial 
3,500 page final report that included recommendations for the 
future.76 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
                                                 
70 Id. 
71 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Core Elements, supra note 37. 
72 Sarkin, supra note 57, at 804. 
73 University of Witwatersrand, Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Background, TRACES OF TRUTH, http://truth.wwl.wits.ac.za/cat_descr.php?cat=1 
(last visited Apr. 06, 2015). 
74 Id. 
75 Borer, supra note 11, at 22. 
76 Id. at 28. 
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The South African TRC was implemented at an opportune 
time when the factors that can undermine implementation were in the 
process of being resolved.77 Some of the factors that can undermine 
the effective implementation of a TRC include weak civil society, 
political instability, victim and witness fears about testifying, a weak 
or corrupt justice system, insufficient time to carry out investigations, 
lack of public support, and inadequate funding.78  The South Africa 
TRC was implemented in 1995, one year after Mandela became 
President in the first democratic election in South African history.  
Although civil society, political stability, and judicial institutions 
were still weak, they were undergoing a period of transformation, and 
were significantly more stable and viable than they had been under 
the Apartheid system.79 More significantly, the public support for 
truth and reconciliation was very strong.80 The South African TRC 
was largely effective because it was implemented at a timely moment 
when there was substantial support in favor of truth and 
reconciliation from civil society institutions and the general public.81 
 
SUCCESS 
 
It is clear that the South African TRC was implemented at a 
good time, and that it met the core elements of an ideal TRC.  
Effective implementation of the core elements of truth and 
reconciliation implies some degree of success, but it does not 
guarantee successful reconciliation from a restorative standpoint.82 
To judge the success of the South African TRC it is necessary to 
consider whether it fulfilled a restorative justice purpose. Proponents 
of the South African TRC suggest that it did facilitate restorative 
justice by enabling perpetrators to relieve themselves of the burden 
of guilt by disclosing the truth, enabled families of victims and 
survivors to discover the truth, and facilitated the process of “healing 
                                                 
77 University of Witwatersrand, supra note, 73. 
78 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 59, at ¶ 51. 
79 University of Witwatersrand, supra note 73. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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the wounds of the past, and transforming anger and grief into 
understanding, thereby creating the climate essential for 
reconciliation and reconstruction.”83  In other words, the South 
African TRC created opportunities for dialogue between victims, 
offenders, and community members, and thus facilitated the 
construction of a shared understanding of the conflict, and a shared 
morality.84  Much of that dialogue occurred through storytelling, 
which victims described as a healing and therapeutic process.85 That 
emphasis on dialogue and ownership of the reconciliation process by 
the parties themselves is indicative of a restorative justice purpose. 
Proponents of truth and reconciliation process in South Africa point 
to the use of storytelling as evidence of the TRC’s ultimate success 
as a restorative justice endeavor.86 
Critics of the South African TRC argue that the TRC did not 
successfully achieve the lofty goal of restorative justice because it 
confused justice with therapy.87 Human Rights Watch criticized the 
South African TRC’s use of amnesty as “condoning major 
justifications for the repression and violence committed by the 
apartheid state.”88 The South African TRC, and TRC’s in general, 
have also been criticized for constructing selective historical records 
that merely reflect compromises and concessions made in the name 
of transitional progress.89 These criticisms raise two serious 
questions.  Does truth telling actually achieve the transformative, 
healing ‘dialogic morality’ advocated by restorative justice? Does 
truth telling involve the kind of dialogue that that is necessary to 
achieve reconciliation?  The answer to both questions is no.  Truth 
telling implies that each party has the opportunity to tell their truth, 
but it does not necessarily involve dialogue between parties, nor does 
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it necessarily lead to reconciliation.  In the South African case, critics 
argue that by offering offenders amnesty in exchange for truth 
telling, the TRC pursued truth at the expense of restorative dialogue 
and reconciliation, and thus created a false sense of reconciliation.90 
At the time the South African government established the 
TRC, the government argued that amnesty was necessary in order to 
achieve the difficult, sensitive, even agonizing balancing act between 
the need to provide justice to victims of past abuses, and the need for 
reconciliation and rapid transition to a new future.”91  The South 
African government sought to limit the use of amnesty by passing 
legislation outlining the measures and procedures of the amnesty 
process, including linking amnesty to specific criteria such as full 
disclosure.92  However, the practice of granting amnesty in exchange 
for truth telling remained highly controversial.93 “Many victims and 
survivors opposed the granting of amnesty because it allowed the 
offender to choose to disclose selectively, about the specific matter 
for which the individual was applying for amnesty.” 94  Victims and 
scholars alike criticize the practice of allowing limited disclosure in 
exchange for amnesty because it frustrated the South African TRCs 
ability to fulfill its mandate to ‘establish as complete a picture as 
possible.”95  It is plausible to suggest that the South African TRC 
would not have achieved as much as it did without the use of 
amnesty.  Nevertheless, there is a nuanced distinction between the 
kind of reconciliation achieved when victims, offenders, and the 
community participate in full, honesty truth telling, followed by 
apology and forgiveness, versus reconciliation achieved when the 
government grants offenders amnesty for limited disclosures.96 
Reconciliation through amnesty lacks catharsis for the victims and 
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the community, and is thus not as restorative as reconciliation 
achieved through meaningful dialogue.97 
The use of amnesty to reconcile parties highlights one of the 
central problems with the South African TRC.  The amorphous idea 
of reconciliation plagued the South African effort to resolve the 
conflict.98 Despite the widespread use of the term ‘reconciliation’ by 
the TRC, it was never clearly defined, nor was the image of what 
reconciliation would look like in the minds of different parties after 
the truth telling process.99 One of the central problems regarding 
reconciliation in the South African case was the emergence of two 
contrary forms of reconciliation, and the failure of the TRC to clarify 
the distinction between the two models of reconciliation.100 The TRC 
sought to promote a religious concept of ‘interpersonal 
reconciliation’ between victims and perpetrators by creating a forum 
for truth telling, and facilitating interpersonal dialogue leading to 
apology.101 However, the South African TRC also pursued a political 
form of reconciliation, ‘national unity and reconciliation’, which was 
more concerned with reconciliation on an institutional level.102 
Twenty years is likely too short a period to judge the success 
of the South African TRC in terms of interpersonal or national 
reconciliation; however, there is evidence to suggest that it did 
succeed to a limited degree on both levels. There are powerful stories 
of interpersonal reconciliation between victims and perpetrators, as 
in the case of the widow who found out through the TRC process that 
her activist husband had been kidnapped and killed;103 after the 
hearing she declared, “don’t we want peace for South Africa? How 
are we going to find peace if we don’t forgive?”104 
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There are other stories of victims unwilling or unable to 
achieve reconciliation with perpetrators.  For example, one mother 
proclaimed that she would never forgive the police officers that killed 
her child; “I want to see them dead, like our children.”105 Despite 
substantial challenges and shortcomings, it t is clear that the South 
African TRC did facilitate healing for some parties, especially those 
who were able to forgive and apologize, and thus successfully 
facilitated restorative justice at the interpersonal level.106  The South 
African TRC also achieved a degree of successful restorative justice 
at the national level by dismantling the institutional structures that 
made human rights violations in South Africa not only possible but 
inevitable.107  If reconciliation in South Africa is measured in the 
absolute terms, the success of the South African TRC is limited.  If, 
on the other hand, reconciliation is viewed as a cycle, an ongoing 
process of dialogue about the past that achieved some degree of 
healing for some participants, the South Africa TRC did achieve 
success from the restorative justice standpoint. 
 
LESSONS 
 
There are many lessons to draw from the South African 
endeavor to pursue truth and reconciliation.  First, it is important to 
implement a TRC after some political stability has been established, 
preferably by a democratic election, which will give a TRC greater 
legitimacy. Second, it is important to ensure that truth telling 
involves actual dialogue between offenders, victims, and the 
community in pursuit of reconciliation; it is problematic to grant 
amnesty.  Third, it is important to define reconciliation as precisely 
as possible, and to distinguish interpersonal reconciliation and 
national reconciliation.  Although South Africa struggled to find the 
right approach to truth and reconciliation, and continues to struggle 
to live peacefully with the past, the South African TRC represents a 
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model for the tremendous potential of TRCs as a tool of restorative 
justice. 
 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA 
 
Both South Africa and Rwanda illustrate the challenges 
facing countries emerging from periods of great political turmoil, 
particularly turmoil associated with gross violation of human 
rights.108 However, Rwanda illustrates the particular challenges of 
pursuing truth and reconciliation after genocide.109 “How does a 
society return to any sort of normality when two neighbors living side 
by side are, respectively, victim and perpetrator of heinous crimes?110  
Rwanda also illustrates the problems inherent in pursing retributive 
justice in a criminal court before restorative truth and reconciliation, 
and the complexity of using pseudo-judicial community-based 
Gacaca Courts to carry out restorative justice.111 
 
ORIGINS 
 
After a period of mounting tensions, hostilities erupted in 
Rwanda in October 1990, when the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda in an effort to overthrow the 
Hutu-run government.112 In response to the invasion, government-
controlled forces attacked minority Tutsi populations and moderate 
Hutus; in turn, the RPF attacked Hutu civilians.113  A ceasefire 
agreement was reached in July 1992, and the civil war officially 
ended on August 4, 1993 with the signing of the Arusha Accords.114 
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Despite the efforts of domestic and international diplomats to 
negotiate a power sharing agreement between Hutus and Tutsis, 
tensions persisted between those ethnic factions.115 In the spring of 
1994, the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (PRF) invaded Rwanda 
from Uganda, and shot down a plane carrying President 
Habyarimana, the Hutu president of Rwanda.116 In retaliation for that 
perceived assassination, Hutu extremists launched their plans to 
destroy the entire Tutsi population, and initiated a genocide in which 
an estimated 500,000 to 1,000,000 people were killed over 100 
days.117  The victims of the genocide were mostly Tutsis, although 
Hutus who had demonstrated support for governmental power 
sharing between Tutsis and Hutus were also targeted.118 
The Arusha agreement of 1993 had established the mandate 
for a Commission of Inquiry and a National Commission on Human 
Rights to investigate human rights violations committed by all parties 
in Rwanda during the civil war.119  However, because of the 
intervening violence, a formal truth and reconciliation commission 
was not established until 1999, when the new Transitional National 
Assembly established the Rwandan National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission (NURC).120  The newly elected 
government of national unity established the NURC with a mandate 
to “organize national public debates aimed at promoting 
reconciliation, foster tolerance and a culture of peace and human 
rights, denounce any ideas aimed at disunity, draft laws to foster 
reconciliation, and monitor whether authorities and the people in 
general ‘respected and observed the policy of national unity and 
reconciliation.’121  In November 2002, the NURC was established as 
a permanent organ of the government of Rwanda. ** A council of 
twelve Rwandan commissioners who form an Executive Committee, 
and a permanent secretariat with three departments, the Department 
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of Civic Education, the Department of Peace Building, and Conflict 
Management, and the Department of Administration and Finance 
now staffs it.122  The NURC has not yet issued a final report, but did 
publish reports from 2000-2001 on reconciliation activities.123 In one 
such report, the NURC reported that: 
Rwandans discovered, to their surprise, that the ethnic 
differences, which have been so much magnified in the past, are not 
the real differences.  The issue in Rwanda was bad governance, the 
culture of impunity and social injustices by successive ruling cliques.  
These have affected almost every Rwandan in one way or another.124 
From a restorative justice standpoint, the establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) by the United 
Nations Security Council in November 1994 significantly 
complicated prospects for reconciliation in Rwanda.125 Between 
January 1997 and December 2012, the ICTR completed the trial 
phase of its mandate by prosecuting 92 people indicted for 
genocide.126 The ICTR produced several significant retributive 
judgments. The tribunal issued the first judgment by an international 
court on genocide in a decision convicting mayor Jean-Paul Akayesu 
of nine counts of genocide and crimes against humanity.127  The 
ICTR’s conviction of Prime Minister Jean Kambanda also constitutes 
the first time a head of government has been convicted for the crime 
of genocide.128 The ICTR continued to do important retributive work 
until 2014, when a new Mechanism for International Criminal 
Tribunals took over the remaining tasks of the ICTR.129 An analysis 
of the retributive work of the ICTR is beyond the scope of this paper; 
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however, it is important to consider the impact of a simultaneous, 
parallel process of retributive justice on attempts to carry out 
restorative justice through truth and reconciliation in Rwanda. 
 
CORE ELEMENTS 
 
The complex and particularly tragic nature of the conflict in 
Rwanda raised many questions about how best to resolve tensions 
among the parties to the conflict.130 Proponents of retributive justice 
argue that prosecution is necessary in order to bring the violators of 
human rights to justice, and to hold them accountable for their 
particularly egregious crimes.131 However, critics of retributive 
justice argue that criminal prosecution resulting in retributive 
punishment can be ineffective in fragile democracies where new 
regimes may not be able to survive the destabilizing effects of 
politically charged trials.132  In lieu of potentially destabilizing 
retributive trials, proponents of restorative justice argue that the 
practice of truth and reconciliation can be more effective in helping 
parties transition toward peaceful resolution of conflict.133 This was 
certainly the ideal goal of the Rwandan NURC when it was 
established in 1999. When implemented, the NURC was confronted 
with the challenge of reconciling a profoundly divided population 
without certain core elements and conditions that support effective 
reconciliation. 
As previously identified, the core elements of a TRC include 
legitimacy drawn from consultation with the public, neutrality of 
personnel, a tailored mandate, adequate resources and funding, and 
the power to fulfill the objectives of the commission through specific 
activities and recommendations.134  Scholars have further 
enumerated three conditions of legitimacy that are necessary for a 
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TRC to work effectively: the truth must be known, the policy of the 
TRC must represent the people’s will, and the policy must abide by 
international human rights norms.135  In Rwanda, the NURC’s 
tailored mandate, the power, and resources available to the 
commission are not in dispute.136  The central problems in Rwanda 
are a lack of legitimacy, neutrality, and lack of popular support.137 
The government undermined the legitimacy of the NURC by failing 
to appoint neutral commissioners and thus alienated the public 
will.138 
In order for a TRC to be legitimate, it is important for 
commissioners to be chosen from a “wide cross-section of society, 
and not be perceived as one-sided or oriented to a certain outcome; 
otherwise the commission will be considered biased and therefore 
illegitimate.”139 Because of the ethnic component of the conflict in 
Rwanda, the inclusion of all ethnic groups, including Hutus and 
Tutsis, was vital to the legitimacy of the commission.  Since the 
overthrow of the Hutu government in 1994, Tutsis excluded Hutus 
from positions of power, including positions on the NURC 
commission.140  “It is not realistic to expect reconciliation as long as 
an unelected minority rules.  Majority rule must be respected.”141 
Although Rwanda has tried to democratize by holding multiple 
elections since 1994, those elections have been plagued by 
corruption; democracy in Rwanda remains elusive today.142 The 
government continues to demonstrate a lack of interest in 
establishing a broad base of support.143 A lack of popular support for 
the governments’ initiatives grew out of fundamentally different 
objectives of the Tutsis and Hutus following the 1994 genocide.144 
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“After 1994, the Tutsi wanted justice above all else, and the Hutu 
wanted democracy.”145 Without democracy, power sharing, and the 
inclusion of all ethnic groups in government, the government 
sponsored truth and reconciliation commission lacked the legitimacy, 
neutrality, and popular support to be effective. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The lack of popular support for the government and the 
NURC in Rwanda grew out of the government’s choice to pursue 
retributive justice before restorative reconciliation.146 The timing of 
the implementation of the NURC created a major obstacle to efforts 
to achieve truth and reconciliation in Rwanda.147 The United Nations 
established a criminal tribunal in 1994 to address the crimes 
committed during the genocide, but the government of Rwanda did 
not seek restorative justice by establishing the NURC until 1999.148 
“For five years, the government of Rwanda refused to talk about 
reconciliation until justice was achieved through retributive 
means.”149 As a result of the emphasis the international community 
and the Rwandan government placed on retributive justice, the 
process of restorative reconciliation in Rwanda was significantly 
compromised.150 
The use of Gacaca Courts illustrates one of the ways in which 
restorative justice was compromised in Rwanda.  Historically, a 
‘gacaca’ was a community-based informal arbitration convened by 
the parties to a civil dispute to sit down and discuss an issue, with the 
goal of achieving a settlement that was accepted by both parties.151  
Post-genocide, the practice of gacaca was manifested in the 
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formation of ‘Gacaca Courts’ in which hearings were held at weekly 
meetings in villages across the country, often outdoors in 
marketplace, or under a tree.152 The hearings achieved a restorative 
purpose by giving victims, offenders and their communities a chance 
to face each other and give evidence about what really happened 
during the genocide and how it happened.153 However, the Gacaca 
Courts confused that restorative purpose by using pseudo-legal 
mechanisms and a retributive framework.154 Elected community 
members lacking legal qualifications served as ‘judges’ and hear 
cases.155 Approximately 65 percent of offenders were found guilty, 
and sentenced to long jail sentences and hard labor.156  In contrast to 
their historically conciliatory purpose, the Gacaca Courts became 
forums for administering retributive punishments.157 
Proponents of the Gacaca Courts argued that the courts 
offered the best possible mechanism to achieve Rwanda’s 
transitional justice goals because they coupled traditional 
community-based justice processes with modern judicial 
practices.158  However, critics argued that by prosecuting offenders 
in a structure designed to achieve a restorative purpose, the Gacaca 
Courts merely lowered the standard of justice, and scarified the 
possibility of societal reconciliation.159  The government of Rwanda 
constructed Gacaca Courts as a mechanism of reconciliation; 
however they did not achieve reconciliation in a restorative sense.160 
“Instead of healing the rift between Hutus and Tutsis, the operation 
of the Gacaca Courts reinforced the rift by affirming the personas of 
innocent or guilty, victim or perpetrator.161  The use of the Gacaca 
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Courts merely reinforced the atmosphere of retribution that clouded 
post-genocide efforts to restore peace in Rwanda.162 
By establishing the ICTR first, the government of Rwanda set 
a retributive tone that permeated all future efforts to resolve the 
conflict. The ICTR pursued truth, and sought to acknowledge past 
human rights abuses, but it did so in order to establish culpability and 
punishments, rather than to open dialogue.163  The criminal trials held 
in the Gacaca Courts aired the ‘truth’ about crimes committed during 
the genocide, but did so in order to punish the offenders, rather than 
to reconcile and heal the victims and the community. When the 
NURC was finally established in 1999, the so-called truth about the 
genocide had already been established, and the perpetrators already 
punished; except it was truth according to the Tutsi victors, not the 
real victims.164 “Those promulgating the genocide trials [were], for 
the most part, not the same people whose families were killed during 
the genocide.”165 From 1994 until 1999, the surviving victims of the 
genocide were largely excluded from the retributive justice process 
and lacked access to restorative options.166 Even after a restorative 
outlet was established by the NURC, opening channels for dialogue 
between offenders and victims, victims were confronted with the 
challenge of telling truths that did not necessarily fit into the 
previously constructed truth about the genocide.167 By seeking 
retributive justice before restorative justice, Rwanda left victims 
feeling unfulfilled by the retributive process and alienated from the 
restorative process. 
 
SUCCESS 
 
When the work of the NURC is evaluated from a restorative 
justice standpoint, the complexity of achieving successful truth and 
reconciliation becomes evident. Rwandans have been working to 
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move past the 1994 genocide for twenty years; however, the capacity 
of the NURC to promote restorative dialogue and healing has been 
quite limited.168 One problem is that the NURC has not produced a 
final report, despite the fact that it has been functioning since 1999.169  
The NURC did produce annual reports until 2001, and did draft a 
history book for public schools aimed at reforming ethnic tensions 
between Hutus and Tutsis.170  A final report, and recommendations 
are only a small measure of the success of a TRC; however, the 
absence of such products point to the inefficaciousness of the NURC.  
Beyond that inefficiency, critics of the NURC argue that it has not 
facilitated substantial justice, restorative or otherwise.171  That is 
because the ICTR has controlled the process of collecting truths since 
1994, and the forum created by the Gacaca Courts in 2001 muddled 
the restorative justice process in Rwanda.172 
The Gacaca Courts likely emerged to fill the void created by 
the lack of opportunities for restorative justice under the NURC.173 
However, instead of providing a parallel track to aid the work of the 
NURC, the Gacaca Courts usurped power from the NURC to become 
the centerpiece of Rwanda’s truth and reconciliation process.174 The 
work of the Gacaca Courts, rather than the NURC, should therefore 
be evaluated in measuring the success of the truth and reconciliation 
process in Rwanda in facilitating restorative justice. 
In theory, the idea of the Gacaca Courts should have 
successfully brought about reconciliation in a restorative sense.  
“Gacaca required people within the communities to work together as 
witnesses, tribunal personnel, and jurors, and in doing so replaced the 
divisive experience of the genocide with the cohesive experience of 
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securing justice.”175  This is certainly a restorative purpose, and 
suggests that the Courts facilitated some successful reconciliation 
from a restorative justice perspective, in the form of dialogue 
between some victims and offenders.176 However, the retributive 
model of the Gacaca Courts undermined their capacity to promote 
healing or forgiveness, which are vital to the restoration of justice.177 
The Gacaca Courts became an odd manifestation of inadequately 
legal retributive justice pursued for an inadequately restorative 
purpose.178 The Courts were set up to clear the backlog of hundreds 
of thousands of people accused of involvement in the killings who 
were awaiting prosecution at the ICTR.179 
The Gacaca Courts certainly achieved results, however those 
results look more like punishment than the healing advocated by 
proponents of restorative justice.180 The Gacaca system could be 
deemed a success from a restorative standpoint because it opened 
channels for dialogue between victims, offenders, and communities 
by creating opportunities for those parties to sit down and talk to one 
another. Yet, it is unlikely that an offender would experience healing 
if he or she enters into dialogue under threat of punishment.  Victims 
and community members may have experienced some restorative 
healing thanks to the opportunity to participate in the Gacaca Courts; 
however the Courts provided offenders very limited possibilities for 
healing.  Because the Courts imposed serious legal punishments 
rather than forgiveness, they were not widely successful in achieving 
restorative outcomes for complex genocide cases.181 Given the 
decidedly retributive nature of the work by the Gacaca Courts, the 
limited restorative work of the NURC, and the extensive retributive 
work of the ICTR, it is evident that retributive justice rather than 
restorative justice was more commonly achieved in Rwanda. 
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LESSONS 
 
Rwanda offers important lessons about the truth and 
reconciliation process.  It is vital for a TRC to include parties who 
fairly represent the population, especially ethnic groups who are 
parties to the conflict.  It is also important for the TRC to draw 
legitimacy from a democratically elected regime.  However, the most 
important lesson from Rwanda is the necessity of implementing a 
clearly restorative truth and reconciliation process before 
undertaking retributive punishment.  Lessons from Rwanda reveal 
the problem of pursing retribution before restorative justice, and 
retribution in the guise of restorative justice. 
 
LEARNING FROM THE PAST: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND 
RWANDA 
 
The practice of promoting truth and reconciliation in order to 
achieve restorative justice is complex, but it is nevertheless a 
worthwhile endeavor.  In order to more effectively implement a TRC 
and successfully achieve the healing that restorative justice can offer, 
it is useful to draw lessons from South Africa and Rwanda.  The most 
important lessons from the South African and Rwandan conflicts can 
be summarized broadly to include the following: democratization, 
authentic dialogue, utilization of neither amnesty nor threat of 
punishment, a restorative process clearly defined and distinguishable 
from retributive justice, and restorative intervention at a moment 
when the conflict is ripe for resolution. 
Both cases illustrate the importance of democratization as the 
first step toward restorative justice, and the formation of a legitimate 
TRC.  The need for truth and reconciliation often arise at a time when 
a society is undergoing a significant political transition.  The post-
apartheid period in South Africa illustrates the complex political 
environment in which many restorative justice endeavors must 
operate. As the South African example demonstrates, it is important 
for the government establishing the TRC to be democratically 
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elected, and representative of the population, for a TRC to have the 
legitimacy necessary to be effective,182 
The restorative justice initiatives undertaken in South Africa 
and Rwanda also illustrate the importance of dialogue in the truth 
telling stage of the truth and reconciliation process.  In order for truth 
telling to create an opportunity for offenders, victims, and the 
community to construct the ‘dialogic morality’ that lies at the heart 
of restorative justice, it is necessary for truth telling to involve an 
authentic dialogue between parties.183  It is important for the parties 
involved in the conflict to actually be involved in that dialogue, and 
not excluded because of their identity, or position as a victor or loser 
of the conflict.184 One of the most challenging questions that any 
TRC must address is ‘who is invited to the table?’ This was a 
question asked in South Africa and in Rwanda.  Only when all the 
relevant parties in the conflict were invited to the table were South 
Africans and Rwandans able to engage in effective reconciliation. 
Another difficult question facing any community seeking to 
implement restorative justice is whether perpetrators will be 
completely forgiven, and crimes will be forgotten?  South African 
style amnesty is not the ideal way to promote that dialogue, nor is a 
punitive Rwandan style ‘gacaca’ court the right forum in which to 
hold restorative dialogue.185 Rather, the restorative justice endeavors 
in South Africa and Rwanda illustrate the need for dialogue emerging 
from authentic, inclusive interaction between all the parties involved 
in the conflict (offenders, victims, and the community), without the 
incentive of amnesty or the threat of punishment.186 Truth and 
reconciliation does not successfully resolve conflict if all is forgotten 
and the slate is wiped clean by amnesty, nor is conflict resolved if 
perpetrators are punished after engaging in truth telling. 
It is also important to have a clear idea and understanding of 
the kind of reconciliation that parties are working toward, whether 
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interpersonal or national reconciliation.187 Before a community can 
effectively implement a TRC or similar restorative justice efforts, 
they should understand the relationship between interpersonal and 
national reconciliation, and the order in which each form will be 
pursued. Interpersonal reconciliation between individuals is an 
important part of the truth and reconciliation process, but it is 
insufficient if not coupled with national reconciliation.188 Although 
it may be difficult to define, it is important for all parties to 
understand what constitutes reconciliation and which type of 
reconciliation they are working toward, so that moments of 
successful reconciliation at each level can be recognized and 
celebrated. 
In addition to distinguishing the type of reconciliation sought, 
the restorative justice endeavors in South Africa and Rwanda reveal 
the need to distinguish restorative versus retributive processes.189 
The relationship between restorative and retributive processes is 
highly complex, and is made more so by the occasional need to 
employ both processes.190 Idealists may advocate for an entirely 
restorative, healing approach, but pragmatists recognize that it may 
be necessary to use both restorative and retributive processes in order 
to help societies effectively move past conflict. 
Most importantly, lessons from the truth and reconciliation 
processes in South Africa and Rwanda reveal the importance of 
timing and ripeness for effective conflict resolution.191 Restorative 
justice practices do not work effectively when the conflict is not ripe 
for resolution. In South Africa, the conflict only became ripe for truth 
and reconciliation following the democratic election of Nelson 
Mandela.192 In Rwanda, the moment of ripeness was delayed because 
of ongoing violence, and did not fully manifest until a new 
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transitional authority was in place.193 Future truth and reconciliation 
endeavors should heed these lessons about ripeness carefully.  If 
democratization has not taken place, or conflict is ongoing, then a 
formal truth and reconciliation initiative will likely be ineffective.  
Societies in conflict must be ready to resolve the conflict before 
victims can site down and engage in authentic dialogue with 
perpetrators. 
These lessons gathered from South Africa and Rwanda, two 
of the most prominent examples of large-scale truth and 
reconciliation processes, can provide useful insight into effective and 
ineffective restorative justice strategies. Future truth and 
reconciliation efforts should heed the lessons learned from these 
restorative justice efforts in order to be successful. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A paradigm shift has occurred that has fundamentally 
changed the nature of conflict in the 21st century.  Conflict is no 
longer predominantly a clash between states, but now involves highly 
complex intrastate conflicts that harms individuals and causes 
national discord. The complex nature of intrastate conflict requires a 
new approach to conflict resolution.  That approach is rooted in 
restorative justice, which gives parties to a conflict ownership over 
their own conflict resolution process. While lessons from South 
Africa and Rwanda reveal significant challenges with the 
implementation and use of truth and reconciliation commissions, the 
phenomenon of truth and reconciliation has emerged out of the 
restorative justice tradition to become a viable, and hopeful model 
for effective conflict resolution. Nelson Mandela once said, “if you 
want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your 
enemy.  Then he becomes your partner.”194 Restorative justice in the 
form of truth and reconciliation offers a hopeful way to transform 
enemies into partners and conflict into peace. 
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